

**JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES,
SOCIAL &
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES**

VOL.1, NO.1, DECEMBER 2020

A PUBLICATION OF THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, SOCIAL AND
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE EDWIN CLARK UNIVERSITY,
KIAGBODO

© FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, SOCIAL AND
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES, EDWIN CLARK UNIVERSITY

All right reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means; either electronic, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission in writing from the publisher.

ISSN: 1597 0396

Designed and Printed by:

All-Stars Publishers,

89 Akpakpava by Dawson Junction,

Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria.

+2348037365921, +2348030969981

Alstarsng@Gmail.Com, Allstarsgroup01@gmail.com www.alstarsng.blogspot.com

EDITORIAL CONSULTANTS

Professor E.V. Clark

Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria

Professor Odion Odama,

University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria

Professor Ugorji UCO

University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria

Professor C. Ewhrudjakpor

Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria

Professor Atare Otite

Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria

Professor Godwin E. Oboh

Benson Idahosa University, Benin, Nigeria

Professor Amadasun Okungbowa

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Professor F.A Sanubi

Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria

Dr Benson Iganisa (Assoc. Prof)

Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria

Dr Osomah Oarhe (Associate Professor)

Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria

Dr Emmanuel Biri

Associate Professor of Mass Communication

Delta State University, Abraka

Dr Abba Abba

Lecturer and Researcher

Department of English & Literary Studies

Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria

LIST OF CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS AND THEIR INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. Professor Juliana I. Okoh
Professor of Theatre Arts, Edwin Clark University, Kiagbodo
2. Professor E.V. Clark
Professor of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka
3. Professor Amadasun Okungbowa
Federal University, Wukari, Taraba State
4. Dr. Moses Mudiagan Adagbabiri
Associate Professor of Political Science, Edwin Clark University, Kiagbodo
5. Dr. Michael Akpovbera Onodje, PhD
Senior Lecturer, Economics Department, Edwin Clark University, Kiagbodo
6. Anthony Ojarikre, PhD
Department of Languages, Edwin Clark University, Kiagbodo
7. Dr. Chinyere Eucharika Ihedioha
Department of Sociology, Edwin Clark University, Kiagbodo
8. Odionye, Chinwe Mirian, PhD
Department of Mass Communication, Edwin Clark University, Kiagbodo
9. Omoshue, Joe Okpako, PhD
Department of Mass Communication, Edwin Clark University, Kiagbodo
10. Yare, Matthew Danjuma
Faculty of Arts, Department of Mass Communication, University of Nigeria, Nsukka
11. Ekiyor, Alare Esther
Department of Mass Communication, Edwin Clark University, Kiagbodo
12. Ebenezer Okorodudu, PhD
Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka
13. Faith Eriuma Onyebuenyi
Department of Financial Studies, Faculty of Management Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria
14. Abdulrasheed Abdulyakeen,
Department of Political Science, Al-Qalam University, Katsina State

- 15 Nnamdi Okonkwo, PhD
Admiralty University of Nigeria, Ibusa, Delta State
- 16 Innocent Ocholi
Admiralty University of Nigeria, Ibusa, Delta State
- 17 Anaele, Rosemary
Department of Political Science, Edwin Clark University, Kiagbodo
- 18 Mary Esiri, PhD
Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Delta State University, Abraka
- 19 Tumbo Hippo Brodrick, PhD
Department of Political Science, Novena University, Ogume, Delta State
- 20 Oriakhi Marian Omosivie, PhD
Institute of Public Administration and Extension Services, University of Benin, Benin City
- 21 Bonga Francis, Eniekedou
Department of Non-formal Education, College of Education, Warri
- 22 Ebegh, Shadrack
Department of Social Studies, College of Education, Warri
- 23 Reuben Daniel, PhD
Department of Social Studies, College of Education, Warri
- 24 Ojighoro Reuben Edaferene, PhD
Department of Religious Studies, College of Education, Warri
- 25 Fada Douperre Paul
Department of Political Science, Federal University Of Otuoke, Bayelsa State
- 26 Michael Gunn
Department of English, University Of Uyo, Uyo, Akwa-Ibom State
- 27 Yusuf Tsojou Ishaya
Department of English and Literary Studies, Federal University, Wukari, Taraba State
- 28 Dr. Victor Abiele Okosun, PhD
Chief Lecturer, College of Education, Ekiadolor, Benin City

- 29 Francis, Monkap Matiki , PhD
Federal College Of Education, Obudu, Cross River State
- 30 Dr. Kenneth. Y. Irhue, PhD
Department of Political Science
Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria
- 31 Dr. Olawale Akenride
Department of Political Science
Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria
- 32 Abdullahi. A. Osuwa
Department of Political Science
Kogi State University, Anyigba, Nigeria
- 33 David Babalola
Nigerian Defence Academy,
Kaduna, Nigeria.
- 34 James Kodilichukwu Anekwe
Federal University, Otuoke.

EDITORIAL

The Chief Editor on behalf of the Editorial Board, has great pleasure in presenting the maiden edition Vol 1 No 1 of the Journal of the Faculty of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences (JFHSMS) Edwin Clark University, Kiagbodo to the research community and the world at large. JFHSMS aims to create a platform between the researchers and authors who seek to publish their work and the people who wish to keep up with the latest findings in the areas of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences. The journal provides opportunities to the researchers, academics and professionals to publish their research papers around the world. The quick review process, quality Editorial Board and quality articles guarantees this Journal as unique.

The Chief Editor is very grateful to the members of the faculty research committee and Editorial Board for their prompt and kind response towards the establishment of this Journal. Their contributions, no doubt is highly commendable and their efforts both human and material cannot be over-emphasized.

We seek the blessings and support of all in the success journey of the Journal.

Prof. (Mrs) Juliana O. Okoh

The Editor-in-Chief

THE POLITICS OF SECESSION AND THE PARODY OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM IN POST-BIAFRA NIGERIA

Olawale O. Akinrinde

Department of Political Science, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria
olawale.akinrinde@uniosun.edu.ng

Abdullahi A. Osuwa

Department of Political Science, Kogi State University, Anyigba, Nigeria
abdulinlondon@gmail.com

David A. Babalola

Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria
davidekiti@gmail.com

Kenneth Y. Irhue, PhD

Department of Political Science, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria
kenneth.irhue@uniosun.edu.ng

ABSTRACT

This article, relying on the strenght of the qualitative orientations,examines the parodies of Nigerian federalism, and empirically established a linkage between these parodies and the unending contests among the centrifugal and centripetal forces within the Nigerian federation. It debunks the popularly held notion of Nigerian federalism as quasi-federalism on the pretext that the purported Nigerian federalism is purely a parody of what federalism stands for and represents. In light of the over-concentration of powers in the center, absence of resource control and fiscal federalism, the limitless powers of the federal government over other federating components, and lack of regional autonomy of the federating components, this article concludes that the unending politics of secession, ethnic rivalry, and underdevelopment would continue as much as the current parody of federalism remains unaddressed.

Keywords: Parody,Secessionism, Inter-group Relations, Federalism, Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces

Introduction

Federalism remains the only known potent political antidote till date, in addressing the problems of irreconcilable political differences and schisms between centrifugal and centripetal social and political forces in an ethnically diverse and socially pluralistic society. However, realities and evidences from federalist states, including advanced federalisms, have shown that the adoption of federalism

has further precipitated what it was initially designed to address: the concerns and interests of the centrifugal and centripetal groups (Fossum & Jachtenfuchs, 2017). Evidences from Nigerian federalism, albeit its shortcomings, has witnessed consistent rise in those calling for more transfer of governmental powers from the center to the component units, and those calling for more concentration of more powers in the center (Suberu, 2010). These two groups,

aside representing the centrifugal and centripetal forces that are always embedded in all federalisms, represent the two geopolitical divides in Nigeria that are, first, those that are comfortable with the current federalist structures and the concentration of powers in the center, and secondly, the group of those that believes there is excessive concentration of powers in the center, and the need for more devolution of powers from the center to the component units, that is, the federating states in Nigeria, and also the need for political restructuring of the Nigerian federalism. Contextually, these irreconcilable differences between the two groups precipitated the Nigerian civil war, the Biafra war from 1967 to 1970, and continue to trigger the unending contradiction of federalism, which of course, the adoption of federalism at independence in Nigeria was meant to address. Unfortunately, rather than address the concerns of the diverse ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Nigerian federalism has further exacerbated the concerns of these groups, thereby putting the existence of the Nigerian state on the precinct of discontinuity (Osaghae, 1998). This article is therefore an attempt to unbundle these dialectics and politics surrounding Nigerian federalism and group relations in its post-Biafra era.

Albeit its political potency and administrative efficacy as a unique and reliable political antidote in addressing the problems of irreconcilable political and ethnic differences in a multi-ethnic societies where centrifugal and centripetal social forces jostle for decentralization and centralization respectively. Federalism wherever practised remains an ideal that can desirably and considerably be pursued, whereas, its truest reality and state of perfection can never be attained even in the most advanced societies. This, justifiably

so, according to its progenitor, makes federalism susceptible to imperfection and human errors when practiced as there is apparently no true federalism anywhere in human organization and society. In its imperfections, federalism accounts for the relative peace most ethnically diverse states that have opted for it as system of governance are currently experiencing.

Federalism, for Suberu (2009) and Isumonah (2003), has been relatively successful in overcoming and containing the syndrome of state disintegration, large-scale internal disorder, and the breakdown of law and order that has afflicted some of the world's other large un-federal states. Nigeria's relative stability, for Suberu (2009), derives significantly from its unique federal structure, which has, over time, been reconfigured, especially after her 1967–1970 civil war from an unstable union of three unwieldy ethnic regions into a more integrated, 36-unit, multiethnic federation. Why Suberu's submission of transformation of Nigerian federalism from an unstable union of three unwieldy ethnic regions into a more integrated 36-unit multiethnic federation may fail the test of contemporary reality and empirical check in contemporary Nigeria is that there has been a resurgence of unprecedented and sustained conflagration between the centrifugal and centripetal forces within the Nigerian state in recent times over the restructuring of the political and governance structures of the country. Within the federalist divides, the advocates of the centrifugal measures and policies have sustained vigorously their demands for the restructuring of Nigeria's governance and political structures in line with the dictates and true idea of federalism since the installation of Nigeria's fourth republic in 1999. This position has been the fulcrum of the Igbo ethnic nationality's agitation in Nigeria since the end of

Nigeria's first republic from 1963 to 1966 which witnessed Nigeria's second coup d'état where many officers of the military of the Igbo ethnic extraction were killed. Late General Agunyi Ironsi who was the military Head of State at the time of this second coup d'état and of the Igbo ethnic nationality was more predisposed to a more centralized governance and administrative system. This was evident in a military decree, popularly known as the "the unification decree, decree 34" that was intended to unify and centralize the governance and political structure of the Nigerian state. In practical terms, this decree emplaced the Nigerian state on the path of unitary system. Agunyi Ironsi's dream of a unitary Nigerian state remained stillborn as he never lived to make it a reality following his killing in the second coup d'état in July 27 1966. The termination of Ironsi's regime and his killing in the coup d'état marked the beginning of ethnic chauvinism, rivalry and jingoism into the Nigerian body polity.

For Johnson and Olaniyan (2017: 1):

"In spite of the consistency of the Biafra agitation through successive administrations, there was a noticeable lull in the secessionist demands during the time of President Good luck Jonathan. The palpable lull in the agitation was, however, short-lived whilst assuming a frightening proportion since the advent of the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015."

Johnson and Olaniyan (2017: 2) tended to have located the sudden resurgence in the Biafra agitation since the emergence of President Muhammadu Buhari's presidency within the primacy of an

interplay of factors such as; the outcome of the 2015 general elections, the question of inclusion and representation; the unfinished nature of the Nigerian civil war; economic challenges, miscalculation both on the part of the Igbo people and indiscretion in the initial appointments made by President Muhammadu Buhari. The outcome of the 2015 general elections, for Johnson and Olaniyan (2017) fell short of the aspirations and expectations of the Biafra agitators whom are mostly of Igbo ethnic extraction. As pointed out by Johnson and Olaniyan (2017), the general expectation of the Biafra agitators and most Nigerians from the South Eastern parts of the country was nothing short of Former President Good luck Jonathan's victory in the 2015 presidential elections, having voted him en-mass during the elections. It was no surprise that former President Good luck Jonathan won both in the South-East and South-South geopolitical zones of the country. However, against the backdrop of the Biafra secessionist agitators and the Easterners' expectations, President Muhammadu Buhari won in the South-West, North-West, North-East and the North-Central zones of the country, thereby winning the presidential elections. This, among other factors, did not go down well with mostly the Igbo whom had wanted and voted for former president Goodluck Jonathan as the president.

The question of inclusion and representation of the Igbo equally came to play in the renewed agitation of the Biafra known as Independent People of Biafra (IPOB). For so long, most especially since the killing of a military head of state of an Igbo origin, General Aguiyi Ironsi in 1966 through a bloody military coup, the Igbo ethnic has been unable to produce another president or head of state for more than fifty years of the 70 years of Nigeria's

existence as a sovereign state. The closest the Igbo had come to the Nigerian presidency was when Alex Ekwueme was elected the vice-president a joint presidential ticket with Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria in 1979. After the termination of the tenure of President Shehu Shagari and Vice-president Alex Ekwueme through a military junta in 1983, no Nigerian of Igbo ethnic extraction had ever been elected to the presidency. This political exclusion disguised as “the will of the majority in a democracy” resonates the visible exclusionary politics the Igbo ethnic nationality has been subjected since Nigeria's civil war (Ekeh, 1996). Given the prevailing politics of ethnicity and diversity that the adoption of a federal system was designed to address in Nigeria officially since independence, has remained constant in intergroup relations in Nigeria, and had become more prominent, assuming a dangerous point in the wake of the 2015 general elections.

Aside the politics of exclusion and underrepresentation of the Igbo at the federal level in terms of accessibility and capacity to contest for and be elected into the presidency; appointments into federal institutions; and parliamentary representation in the National Assembly, the unfinished nature and business of the civil war continues to give more impetus to the secessionist agitations of the Igbo through the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) movement. What is therefore clear in these dialectics is the continued paradox of the government in relying on its adopted quasi-federal system to resolving the secessionist agitations of centrifugal forces as that of the IPOB. The next section considers a few of the dialectics and contradictions that make the Nigerian federalism wholly inefficient in addressing the usual contestation between the centrifugal and centripetal forces as

epitomized in inter-group relations in Nigeria that is characterized by secessionist movements and agitations.

The Dialectics and Parody of Federalism in Nigeria since Independence

Federalism is a system of government in which powers are between a centre and component units or regions. Federalism, as a borrowed system of government in Nigeria, was never an indigenous origination of a pre-colonial Nigeria. No kingdom, emirate or chiefdom prior to colonial governance in Nigeria had a semblance of a federal structure or system where powers were divided between a centre and other units or levels of governance. Matter-of-factly, the pre-colonial Hausa emirate governance system had other component units of authorities and governance within the emirate system, but these component and levels of emirate administrations were never a coordinate of the centre of the emirate. For instance, in the pre-colonial Kano emirate system, there were several emirates headed by emirs with delegated powers to administer their respective emirates. However, these emirates were never a equal coordinate of the Kano Emirate which was also headed by an Emir under whose authority other emirs of the smaller emirates within the Kano emirate govern. Although, the pre-colonial system of governance had no semblance of an emirate system of the Hausas and Fulanis, however, it visualized a cabinet system where there was an Oba and Bashorun who acted as the head of state and head of government respectively. Whilst there were sub-levels of authorities and administration in the kingdom like the war-post (a military camp headed by the Balogun or the Aare Onakakanfo), these levels of authorities or administration were never coordinates of the seat of the Oba power. For instance, whilst there were several kingdoms within the pre-colonial

Old Oyo Empire such as the Ede Kingdom (a military camp/town set up by the Alaafin of Oyo) and others, they were never coordinates to the Oyo kingdom headed by the Alaafin of Oyo. The pre-colonial Igbo governance system, on the other hand, was one that differed from both the Hausa and Yoruba's respectively, and tended to be acephalous but was never a federal arrangement. This forecloses the possibility that there were glimpses of a federal structure or federal arrangement in pre-colonial Nigeria. No doubts, the foundations of a federal system were laid by the colonial administrators of colonial Nigeria. It began with the division of the colonial Nigeria into three regions – North, West and Eastern regions, by the then Governor-General, Bernard Bourdillon. The regions thus became independently administered regions under the Sir Arthur Richard's Constitution of 1946. This federal premise was built upon by subsequent colonial constitutions of Macpherson's and Lyttleton's before it was adopted by an independent Nigeria in 1960 following her attainment of statehood.

As expected, the adoption and practice was never meant to be perfect from inception. First, it was new to any known indigenous governance system in pre-colonial (Suberu, 2001). Second, its adoption and practice were far from perfection where it originated from and being operationalised for many years long before attempts to domesticate it in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria governance systems. Hence, there is not any perfect federal system across the world where all the ideals and principles of federalism are practised.

Following the official adoption of a federal system by Nigeria in 1960 with three regions making up the Nigerian federation, the prevailing politics of regionalism, ethnicity, exclusion, religious affiliations,

and minority question was billed to be addressed (Osaghae and Suberu 2005). This was so expected due to the logic that the adoption of a federal system, among other imports, would allay the fear of all the ethnic nationalities and regions of possible political and social domination in their intergroup political, social and economic relations. Above all other considerations, the social and ethnic diversities of the Nigerian people at independence thus informed the adoption of a federal system. The reluctance of the North towards independence in the build-ups to 1960 coupled with the fear of other regions over the possibility of one region dominating others eventually provided a virile ground for the general consensus to adopt a federal system.

However, the federalist experiences in Nigeria since independence have rather been somewhat dialectical to the underlying reasons that necessitated the adoption of federalism. None of the general observers and scholars of Nigerian federalism as well as the Nigerian citizenry had expected a perfect federal system in Nigeria, especially when one considers the experiences of even the most politically sophisticated systems as the United States, Germany, Australia and others. What is puzzling in the Nigerian experience is the case of complete parody of the practice of federalism. From a general distinction from what is contained in her federalist constitution to what is being practised, the Nigerian state continues to drift away from the state of parody to complete jettisoning of the provisions of federalism to political centralization and unitary system. The question here therefore is why has Nigeria become a parody of federalism?

The lopsided relationship between unequal federating components

The classical idea of a federal system lies in the equality of the federating coordinates in the federal arrangement. Anything short of this is a parody and mockery of the spirit of federalism. This has been the situation in Nigeria since independence. The Nigerian federal system recognizes three levels of governance which are the federal government, the state government, and the local government. The Nigerian federal constitution recognizes the three levels of government as independent levels of government with their respective spheres of authorities. In the sharing of the federal powers to the three levels of government, the federal government is granted the constitutional powers to legislate and execute authority on the matters that fall within the exclusive list. Only the federal government can legislate on matters of the executive list which include defense, armed forces, aviation, currency, war, foreign policy and others. The federal government and the state government, on the other hand, are granted powers to legislate on matters that are contained in the concurrent list. The concurrent list includes education, agriculture, infrastructures, health, security, housing, transportation, land and others. Lastly, the local government exclusively legislates on matters that border on matters that are spelt out in the residual list which include chieftaincy title, markets, registration of birth and death, street naming etc. However, despite the constitutional division of powers among the three levels of government as independent tiers, the relationship among the three levels has remained a master-servant relationship where the master (the federal government) does what it must whilst the servant (the servants) accept what they must. The refusal of the federal government led by

former President Olusegun Obasanjo to release the statutory twenty-one month local government allocations to Lagos State despite the Nigerian Supreme Court's ruling in favour of the release is a case of the unequal relationships among the tiers of government in Nigeria.

The federal government pays the political piper, and dictates the political tunes regardless of the federal provisions in the constitution. This is the case with the issue of internal security as it pertains to the security of lives and properties across the federation. Whilst the constitution provides that the powers of security of lives and properties are the function of all the three federating levels of government, only the federal government controls the internal security architecture in Nigeria. Aside the Neighborhood Watch in Lagos State created by Lagos State House of Assembly to help combat crime within Lagos state by reporting suspicious potential crimes to the Police and accosting suspected criminals and handing them over to the Nigerian Police; coupled with the HISBAH security outfit created by most northern states in Nigeria that practise the Sharia legal system, no other state government had set up or controlled a civil security agency that can facilitate the security of lives and properties within their states until year 2020 when the Western Nigerian Security Network otherwise known as the Amotekun Corps was established by the Houses of Assemblies of the states in the South-western region of the country. All the while and until recently, the only police force, the Nigerian Police Force (a force of about 300, 000 personnel providing security to about 200, 000, 000 Nigerians) in Nigeria has been a centralised federal government security agency. The federal government controls the structure, operations and affairs of the police. In fact, the commissioners of the

Nigerian Police that head the police command at the state level are not accountable to the state governors. They are accountable to the Inspector General of Police who only reports to the president. This explains the parody of the practice of a federal system in Nigeria.

Over-centralization of governance and the Parody of Federalism in Nigeria

Governance in a federal state is not an exclusive preserve or prerogative of any of the federating units or components in a federal arrangement world-over. Unlike what is obtainable in advanced federal systems, governance in Nigeria has been heavily centralized and continues to drift towards a complete parody of the practice of federalism in Nigeria. Nigeria operates a 36-states and federal capital territory governance system where an executive president heads the federation and governs from the capital territory whilst the governors govern the states. Federalism requires that the functions and powers of governance must be devolved amongst the federating units in a federation. From this premise, one would have expected that the task of securing lives and properties that constitutes the core of any reasonable and modern-day governance would be naturally devolved and undertaken by all the levels or tiers of governance in a federation as Nigeria. Paradoxically, only the federal government in Nigeria undertakes the task of security of lives and properties in Nigeria. Whilst the Nigerian constitution recognizes and empowers all the three tiers of government with the powers and function to secure lives and properties, in practice, only the federal government controls the security apparatus. Whilst in advanced federal systems, all components units (from federal/central government to local/county governments) operate their own independent police department, the

Nigerian federalism, in practice abhors state and local governments (as independent federating components) from establishing their own police department. Again, the practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria is a complete parody to the classical idea of federalism. Whilst federalism requires and supports the control of the federating units within a federation over their own resources, the Nigerian federalism places the control of the federation's natural resources within the whims and caprices of the federal government. As a monolithic economy that exists and survives only on the proceeds from the exportation of crude oil, the Nigerian federal government controls the Niger Delta oil and determines for whom to be sold, the amount of revenue that goes back to the Niger Delta region. This is the fate of all states within the Nigerian federation. No state controls its natural resources or endowments, except land which the Nigerian constitution has emplaced within the jurisdiction of the states. Despite this, the federal has been subtly trying as much as it can to appropriate more constitutional powers to the center. For instance, in an attempt to arrogate more powers and functions to itself (the center), the federal government is sponsoring a bill known as the "Water Resources Bill" in the National Assembly in the current year 2020. The aim is to bring all "water resources" on land and under the land under the control of the federal government. Whereas, the 1999 constitution provided that all lands within the Nigerian federation belong to the states and not the federal government, the action of the federal government is thus an attempt, by all indications, to take more powers away from the federating components to the center. All these actions only mean one thing the non-existence of federalism in the first place, or at best, the existence of the counterfeit and a parody of

federalism in Nigeria.

Biafra Secessionist Agitation, Intergroup Relations and the Parody of Nigerian Federalism

No federalism is perfect, but then, no federalism is also quasi. It is either it is federalism or not federalism. Thus, if this premise is to be relied upon in ascertaining whether a political system is a federal system or not, then there will be no such concepts as quasi-federalism or developing federalism. Why it has been argued that no federalism is perfect is apparently due to the human factor in the practice of federalism. Federalism is not imperfect because its ideals and philosophies are flawed, but, rather, as a result of the dynamic nature of humans in its practice. Apparently, the imperfection of federalism is not located in the absence of one or more of its ideals and classical principles. When any or all of its principle is/are absent in a federal system, such a system becomes a parody of federalism. And, at this point, it does no longer serve its purposes as an efficient administrative and governance antidote in addressing the problem of constant and unsettled conflagrations between centrifugal and centripetal intergroup relations.

It has been established that Nigeria has never been a federal state when compared against the backdrop of a federal system, as espoused by K.C wheare. Resource control, fiscal federalism, independence and autonomy of the federating units in a federation to administer their own affairs without overbearing interference from the federal government at the center, state police, devolution of power and governance, among others, are a few of the distinctive attributes of a federal state that sets it apart from others. None of the aforementioned federalist ideals and practices is respected or practised in

Nigeria. Since independence, for instance, the issue of resource control has been one of the major parodies of federalism in Nigeria. No region or state had ever been allowed to control its own resources since independence in Nigeria. In fact, this contributed to the eventual outbreak of the Nigerian 30-month civil war from 1967 to 1970. The states in the South-South geopolitical zone house the crude oil that sustains the Nigerian economy. Sadly, none of these South-South states controls its own resources despite the environmental hazards and oil-spillage that accompany the oil-exploration by the federal government in this South-South Niger Delta. This alone dislodges any premise, justification or argument that attempts to see the Nigerian state as a federation or a federal state. True federal system provides for fiscal federalism and allows each federating unit or component to control its own resources. This explains why the so called "Nigerian federalism", widely famed as quasi-federalism, which in the real sense is nothing but a parody, has failed to address the problem of politics of ethnicity and diversity, for which it was adopted.

Beyond the issue of issue of resource, another completely entrenched practice that makes the Nigerian federalism a complete parody is the over-centralization of internal security architecture in the country. Till date, the localization of the police remains a fleeting mirage in Nigerian federation, even when, non-federal systems are already embracing the utility of state and local police; the security of lives and properties through the instrumentality of the police remains an exclusive prerogative of the Federal Government. Despite the recognition of the governors of states within the Nigerian federation as the chief security officers of their states, they completely lack the

institutional and structural provisions to perform their responsibilities as CSOs of their states. The Commissioners of police that ideally should be made to report to the governors at the state level, reports only to the Inspector General of Police, who, in return, reports to the President of the federation. This practice negates the essence of federalism, and suggests very clearly a parody of the federal system in Nigeria.

The implication of these parodies of Nigerian federalism hinges on the continued politics of ethnicity, centrifugal and centripetal relations, violence, and bitterness in intergroup relations. Rather than address these unconventional patterns of intergroup politics that are filled with mutual suspicion, hatred, and supremacy battle, violence, and secessionist agitations, the Nigerian federalism has become a victim of what it was meant to address. The Nigerian federalism has however become a source of intergroup contestations, rivalry and unconventional politics of bitterness, parochialism, corruption and secessionist agitations. Since Nigerian version of federalism, loosely dubbed as quasi-federalism, has failed to allay the fears of the diverse ethnic nationalities and groupings by failing to allow each federating unit (states and local governments) govern independently and in accordance with the ideals of federalism, secessionist politics and movements therefore offer the ethnic groupings an opportunity to actualize their political aspirations outside of the federation. This therefore explains in great depth the rationale behind the sustained clamours from the Igbo nationality for secession. This therefore is no coincidence, as many more of the clamours for secession and its politics from other ethnic groupings, is predicted to intensify and gain more momentum. This explains the latent

advocacy and calls from the Yoruba-speaking states for restructuring (a fundamental change to the political system and structure of the country) in recent time. In praxis, intergroup relations in a paradoxical and quasi federal system as Nigeria would continue to be characterized by constant centrifugal and centripetal contest and secessionist politics as evident in Nigeria since independence.

Conclusion

Building on preceding arguments, this argument has unbundled the dialectics and parodies of Nigerian federalism. It established that there is no such political system as quasi-federalism anywhere in the world. The idea of a federal system being a quasi or developing federalism was an escapist strategy to window-dress political systems that are not federalism-practicing systems. All the ideals and principles of federalism are unambiguous and clear. When any or all of these principles which, among other things, include, fiscal autonomy, resource control, independence of each federating unit to administer its own affairs, devolution of powers among the federating coordinates etc., is/are missing in a federal system, such a federal system becomes a parody and dialectical. It therefore becomes another source of political problem when; rather than address the common teething political problems of ethnic diversity, intergroup contests over resource and power appropriation and tendencies, it promotes them.

It is in light of this premise, this paper recommends that the current parodies and dialectics of Nigeria federalism characterizing the supposed Nigerian quasi-federalism must be revisited, jettisoned and abandoned in an attempt to promoting true federalism in its undiluted form. This remains the only strategy to

addressing the politics of secessionism, divisionism and ethnic intergroup rivalry that characterize the Nigerian federal system and intergroup relations.

References

- Ekeh, P.P. (1996). “*Political Minorities and Historically Dominant Minorities in Nigerian History and Politics*”, in O. Oyediran (ed.), *Governance and Development in Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Professor Billy J. Dudley*, Ibadan: Agbo Areo Publishers.
- Fossum, J.E., Jachtenfuchs, M. (2017). Federal Challenges and the Challenges to Federalism: Insights from the EU and Federal States. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 24 (4).
- Isumonah, Adefemi (2003). Migration, Land Tenure, Citizenship and Communal Conflicts in Africa. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 9, 1: 1-19.
- Johnson, I., Olaniyan, A. (2017). The Politics of Renewed Quest for a Biafra Republic in Nigeria. *Defence and Security Analysis*, Vol. 33 (4), 1-13, DOI : 10.1080/14751798.2017.1382029.
- Osaghae, E.E. (1998). Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided Society: The Nigerian Experience. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 36, No 1.
- Osaghae, E.E., Suberu, R.T. (2005). “*A History of Identity, Violence and Stability in Nigeria.*” Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) Working Paper No. 6. Queen Elizabeth House: Oxford University Press.
- Suberu, R.T. (2001). “*Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria.*” Washington: United States Institute for Peace.
- Suberu, R.T. (2009). Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective. *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 8. (1), 67-86.
- Suberu, R.T. (2010). The Nigerian Federal System: Performance, Problems and Prospects. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 28 (4).